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LABOR LAW: REQUIRING EMPLOYER TO BARGAIN
WITH OLD UNION AT NEW LOCATION IN "RUNAWAY
SHOP" SITUATION IS BEYOND NLRB'S AUTHORITY
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that
the NLRB cannot force an employer who has relocated his plant
in order to escape a union to bargain with that union at the new
location where the union had not secured a majority position. This
note examines the possible remedies that may be available to the
Board against such "runaway shops" and evaluates each of them
in light of the-language and purposes of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
DISCRIMINATORY relocation by an employer to avoid bargaining
with the representative of his employees has long presented complex
problems for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).' In the
recent case of Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB, 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that, in
such a "runaway shop" situation, it was beyond the NLRB's authority
to require the employer to bargain with the old union at the new and
distant location where that union had not yet obtained majority
status. The court found this attempted expansion of prior Board
practice improper since the Board failed to relate the proposed
remedy to the grievances of the workers left behind. The decision
clearly raises the problem of determining the proper scope of the
Board's remedial powers in the "runaway shop" context.
Garwin, a New York corporation, had relocated in Florida under
1 See, e.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), enforced sub nom. Phila-
delphia Dress Joint Board, Garment Workers v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (1962) (per
curiam); S & K Knee Pants Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 940 (1937); cf. California Footwear Co.,
114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955), modified sub nom. Lewis v. NLRB, 246 F.2d 386 (1957).
The "runaway shop," or discriminatory relocation, has been a common employer prac-
tice. See generally Daykin, Runaway Shops: The Problem and Treatment, 12 LAB.
L.J. 1025 (1961); Note, Legal Problems Raised by the Relocation of Industry: The
Runaway Shop, 36 COLUM. L. Rav. 776 (1936); Note, The "Runaway Shop"-An Im-
pediment to Peaceful Union Management Relations, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 136 (1961); Com-
ment, Labor Law-The National Labor Relations Board's Pursuit of the Runaway Shop,
7 VILL. L. Rav. 450 (1962); Note, Vested Rights in the Runaway Shop, 13 W. Ras. L.
REv. 360 (1962).
374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), Imodifying Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965).
the name of S'Agaro, Incorporated while a valid collective bargain-
ing agreement was in force with the International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union (ILGWU) in New York. Garwin concealed its
relocation plans, and the ILGWU did not discover the shift until it
was almost completed. Both the trial examiner and the Board found
that the relocation had been made to escape the union and had not
been dictated by economic considerations.4 Because of anti-union
animus, the relocation was found to constitute a violation of National
Labor Relations Act sections 8 (a) (1),5 8 (a) (3),6 and 8 (a) (5)7 as an
3 The trial examiner found S'Agaro to be the alter ego of Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B.
at 677. The Board affirmed this finding, 153 N.L.R.B. at 664, and the court of appeals
agreed, 374 F.2d at 298.
An alter ego or successor corporation is one so tied to the prior corporation by
officers, owners, assets, and customers that it is deemed the legal equivalent of the
prior corporation and thus subject to the legal relations of the predecessor. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc., 825 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1963); Rome Prods. Co.,
77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1234 (1948).
' 153 N.L.R.B. at 664, 680. If a motivating factor in management action is opposi-
tion to unionism, such action may constitute an unfair labor practice under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. That there are additional reasons for such actions has been
held to be no defense as long as the employer was "partly motivated" by anti-unionism.
NLRB v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 950 (1963). But cf. cases cited note 8 infra and accompanying
text.
5 Section 8 (a) (1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7 ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1) (1964). Section 7 states: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing . . . ." Id. § 157.
The runaway shop, although not specifically forbidden, has been held to be an
unfair labor practice under the Act. E.g., Industrial Fabricating Inc., 119 N.L.R.B.
162, 168-70 (1957), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir.
1959) (per curiam); Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1233 (1948); cf. Schieber
Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, 960, modified by consent, 116 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940).
See generally NLR.B v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 122 F.2d 368, 377 (9th Cir.
1941): "Interference, restraint and coercion are not acts in themselves but are descriptive
and are the result of acts. Whatever acts may have the effect of interference, restraint
and coercion are included in those terms, and are therefore prohibited. Thus, they
include a great number of acts which, normally, could be validly done, but when they
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights, they are pro.
hibited by the Act." Id.
Where relocation is made for "economic reasons" the Act is not violated. Mount
Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954). The law is not entirely
clear when economic justification and anti-union feeling coincide. Note, Vested Rights
in the Runaway Shop, 13 W. Ras. L. Rnv. 360, 365-68 (1962).
0 Section 8 (a) (3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization...." 29
U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1964). Only discrimination which is motivated by a desire to en-
courage or discourage union membership violates the Act. Radio Officers' Union v.
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effort to discourage union membership and to avoid the duty of
bargaining with the union.8 The circuit court expressly affirmed
these findings.9 Moreover, apart from the discriminatory motivation,
Garwin's failure to bargain with the union0 concerning the effects of
the decision to relocate upon the New York employees" was held to
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-44 (1954); see Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393, 412-16
(1941), modified per curiam, 137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 763 (1942);
cf. E-Z Mills, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1039, 1043-46 (1953).
7Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9 (a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964). Section 9 gives an employer,
faced with a demand for union recognition, the right to petition the Board for a
hearing on whether the union represents his employees. Ad. § 159 (c) (1). The Board
is not to order an election, however, if a valid election already has been held within
the previous year. Id. § 159 (c) (3). Furthermore, the employer's doubt as to the
union's majority status must be bona fide, and a bad faith refusal to bargain, designed
to undermine the union by delaying recognition, in an unfair labor practice. Mount
Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365, 373 (4th Cir. 1953). The good faith limita-
tion is based upon the rationale that the petition procedure is designed to insure that
the employer is dealing with the freely chosen representatives of his employees, and
that its function is not to supply the employer with a procedural device with which he
can thwart such representation. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
A "refusal to bargain" has been found when the employer expressly recognized the
union but thereafter shut down the plant in order to avoid dealing with the union. New
England Web, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1026, enforcement denied, 309 F.2d 696 (Ist Cir.
1962). The "runaway shop" also constitutes such an illegal refusal. Diaper Jean Mfg.
Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1048 (1954), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Tredway, 222 F.2d
719 (5th Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
8 153 N.L.R.B. at 664-65, 680. It has been suggested that a bona fide, permanent
liquidation of an entire business, even if impelled by anti-union motives, is not an
unfair labor practice since the Act is designed to govern actions while one remains
an employer and not to force persons to remain employers. Further, the employer
pays a high price for his immunity, and it is not thought that such a holding would
encourage spiteful liquidations. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380
U.S. 263, 269-77 (1965), vacating Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963); NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908, 914 (8th Cir. 1954).
11374 F.2d at 299.
10 The employer's duty to bargain collectively binds him to "confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment... the
duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to [a collective bargaining]
contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party [offers to negoti-
ate] .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1964). There is no obligation to agree or to make
concessions, however. Id.
Subcontracting is a subject of bargaining. E.g., Local 1304, Steelworkers v. NLRB,
322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964). Discontinuance of one of several plants or operations is also the
subject of bargaining. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), modified, 361
F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
21 In at least one case the Board has suggested that the duty to bargain requires
that negotiations with the union be an integral part of the management's decision-
making in the first instance. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1026-28
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be an independent violation of sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (5) of the
Act.12 The circuit court only implicitly affirmed this holding.'3
The order promulgated by the NLRB provided the usual back
pay and reinstatement remedies for the violation of sections 8 (a) (1)
and 8 (a) (3) .14 These were not challenged on appeal. However, in
substitution for the union's request that Garwin be ordered to return
to New York to remedy its violation of section 8 (a) (5),15 the Board
further ordered Garwin to bargain with the ILGWU in Florida,1"
(1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). This view has been criticized on the
grounds that it is the effectuation of the decision and not the making of it which
affects conditions of employment. Goetz, The Duty to Bargain about Changes in Opera-
tions, 1964 DuKE L.J. 1, 14-16; see Farmer, Bargaining Requirements in Connection
with Subcontracting, Plant Removal, Sale of Business, Merger and Consolidation, 14
LAB. L.J. 957 (1963). Furthermore, two federal circuits have held that there is no
duty to bargain concerning the decision itself, which is "clearly within the realm of
managerial discretion," but that there is a duty to bargain concerning the effects of
such a decision. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553, 562 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated
per curiam, 379 U.S. 644, aff'd on remand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1011 (1966); NLR.B v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961).
12 153 N.L.R.B. at 664-65, 680.
18 An independent violation of section 8 (a) (5)-one which did not involve anti-union
motivation, but which merely resulted from a failure to bargain concerning the effects
of a decision to change operations-might be remedied by requiring such bargaining
and by giving the employees damages for back pay. The employer should not be
ordered to bargain about resumption of operations, however, since such negotiations
would probably be futile. See, e.g., NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512, 517
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
1 153 N.L.R.B. at 667, 680-81. Alternative remedies are usually provided for run-
away shop violations of sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3). If the employer chooses to return
to the old location, he must reinstate the discharged employees at substantially their old
positions and make them whole for any lost pay. For computation of back pay see Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716 (1962), enforcement denied, 322 F.2d
913 (1963); F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950). Conversely, if the employer
chooses to remain at the new location, he must offer reinstatement with no loss
of fringe benefits or seniority, travel expenses, and back pay. Any employee who does
not accept the offer must continue to be paid until he is hired elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 554-55 (1961), enforced sub nom. Philadelphia
Dress Joint Board, Garment Workers, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962) (per curiam);
Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480, 499-500 (1953), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1220-
21 (1948); Note, 77 HAmv. L. Rrv. 1100, 1106-11 (1964). The Board is not limited to
these measures, however. See Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1964).
2 153 N.L.R.B. at 681. The court of appeals held that the Board's denial of a
return order was not an abuse of discretion. 374 F.2d at 300 n.7.
2 Although no specific duration was given the efficacy of the bargaining order, it
would have presumably continued for a reasonable time. See Franks Bros. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1944). "Reasonableness" would perhaps be determined by the
one-year certification bar rule. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). But see
NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1965). The Board's order
provided that if a collective bargaining agreement were reached it would be a bar to an
election petition for only one year, rather than for the duration of the contract. 153
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regardless of whether the union achieved majority status there.' 7
Refusing enforcement of this order, the circuit court determined it
to be arbitrary, punitive, and contrary to the underlying policy of
existing labor legislation.' According to the court, the order with-
held the important right of free choice from the Florida employees
without relating this restriction to the need for redressing the injuries
suffered by the workers in New York or the need for insuring a free
vote by the Florida workers in future representation elections.19
Thus unrelated, the order could not be justified merely by a desire to
preclude Garwin from realizing the fruits of its wrongdoing.20
The remedial policy of the National Labor Relations Act is to
restore the status quo ante,21 and the NLRB has broad discretion in
fashioning forms of relief to effectuate that policy.22  The primary
N.L.R.B. at 667. For discussions of the normal contract bar rule see Freidin, The
Board, the "Bar," and the Bargain, 59 COLUM. L. Rav. 61 (1958), and 111 U. PA. L. REv.
283 (1963).
17 153 N.L.R.B. at 666. This order did not originate with the trial examiner but
he recognized the need for it. Id. at 682.
18 The scheme of national regulation is designed "to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging . . . collective
bargaining and protecting. . . freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of [the employee's] own choosing .... ." National Labor
Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964); see NLRB v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 133
F.2d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1943) (the NLRA is "a remedial measure to prevent and fore-
stall the impact of labor controversies upon commerce'). See generally Ratner, The
Quasi-Judicial NLRB Revisited, 12 L~a. L.J. 685 (1961).
10 374 F.2d at 300-02.
20 Id. at 302-04.
"'-See Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d
846 (5th Cir. 1963) ("[R]emedial action, if it is to afford an effective redress . . . must
be tailored to restore the wronged to the position he would have occupied but for the
action of the wrongdoer."); Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 778 (1939), modified, 29
N.L.R.B. 14 (1941); cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
22 The Board has the power to order "such affirmative action ... as will effectuate
the policies of this Act." National Labor Relations Act § 10 (c), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c)
(1966). "[No specific remedies are provided because] the field of national labor
relations is ever changing . . . . Nevertheless, it seems obvious that in passing the
Act, Congress did not engage in the empty gesture of creating rights without parallel
remedies." Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1962), enforced,
316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963); see Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203, 216 (1964); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-49 (1953);
Phelps-Dodge Corp. V. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). See generally Johannesen,
Case of the Runaway Mill: Darlington Manufacturing Company, 12 LAB. L.J. 1189
(1961).
It has been argued that the Board should exercise greater remedial creativity. See
Comment, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 69 (1963). Contrary opinion contends that arbi-
trator decisions should be preferred since they allow the parties to settle issues between
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aim is to dissipate, insofar as possible, all consequences of the unfair
labor practice. 23 The remedy provided, however, may be neither
punitive 24 nor arbitrary.25  Moreover, in order to be enforced by the
courts,28 the relief granted must be in furtherance of the policy of
the Act and must be based upon substantial evidence.2 7
themselves whenever such a course is practicable. Rains, Plant Removals and Related
Problems; A Panel Discussion, 13 LAB. L.J. 914, 917 (1962).
However, the Board has traditionally taken an ad hoc approach to its task of
formulating a remedy which is adaptable to complex and specialized factual contexts,
even though a more rigid stare decisis approach to remedial technique might benefit
litigants by enhancing predicability. See Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-
Which Should It Be?, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 658 (1957); McCulloch, The Develop-
ment of Administrative Remedies, 14 LAB. L.J. 339 (1963).
28 "The public right and the duty [vested in the Board] extend not only to the
prevention of [future] unfair labor practices ... but to the prevention of his enjoyment
of any advantage which he has gained by violation of the Act." National Licorice
Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940); see, e.g., Local 60, Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB,
365 U.S. 651, 655-56 (1961); NLRB v. District 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958);
Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187-89, 194 (1941); NLRB v. Delight Bakery,
Inc., 353 F.2d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 1965).
5 4 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-15 (1940). In Republic, the
Board's order had directed the company to deduct from the employees' back pay the
amounts the employees had received for work performed upon "work relief projects"
and to pay that amount to the appropriate government agency. The Court held
that utilization of § 10 (c) to impose such punitive sanctions did not comport with
the remedial spirit of the Act. See NLRB v. Coates & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556, 561-62
(5th Cir. 1957).
25 See NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960).
26 Section 10 (e) of the NLRA provides that the Board may petition the appropriate
court of appeals, or, if it is in vacation, the appropriate district court, for enforcement
of its order. Section 10 (f) gives the same right of petition to any party "aggrieved by
a final order." Section 10 (g) provides that the commencement of such proceedings
shall not operate as a stay of the Board's order unless the court so orders. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 160(e), (f), (g) (1964).
27 Section 10 (e) of the Act provides in part: "The findings of the Board with respect
to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole shall be conclusive." Id. § 160 (e). Substantial evidence is that "which a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). "Substantial evidence is more than a scin-
tilla .... NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
The circuit courts can neither weigh the evidence de novo nor substitute their judg-
ment for the Board's conclusions based on that evidence. However, "in the fringe or
borderline cases, where the evidence affords but a tenuous foundation for the Board's
findings, the Court of Appeals [will] scrutinize the entire record with care, and be at
liberty, where there is not 'substantial evidence,' to modify or set aside the Board's
findings." Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 914 (1951).
Also, the Board may infer from proven facts such conclusions as are reasonable.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945). Of course, the Board
must draw on its experience as well as the facts in the case before it. NLRB v. Seven.
Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953).
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With regard to remedies for relocation, it may plausibly be
contended that an order to resume operations at the original location
meets the above requirements. Although no completely relocated
employer has yet been compelled to return, the NLRB considers such
a requirement to be an enforceable remedy.28 Arguably, the failure
to invoke such a requirement creates a remedial gap in the case of
long distance relocations since the usual relief for a refusal to bargain
-a bargaining order-is ordinarily conditioned upon the union estab-
lishing majority status at the new location. 29 Since the propensity for
old employees to move to the new location decreases in direct pro-
portion to the distance moved,30 the employer may thus be able to
escape the union merely by a tender of moving expenses, back pay,
and a meaningless offer of reinstatement.31
Nevertheless, absent a return order, another logical method of
preventing such an escape is an unconditional order compelling the
employer to bargain with the old union at the new location. Uncon-
23 See Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15, 19-20 (1965); Rome Prods. Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1217, 1238 (1948); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, 966-67, modified
by consent, 116 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940). But see Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1371 (1954), enforcement denied, 226 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1955) (per
curiam).
Unconditional orders to resume former operations have been used in connection
with other types of unfair labor practices such as partial closing and subcontracting.
See Riverside Wholesale Distribs., 142 N.L.R.B. 580, 580-81 (1963); Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 555 (1962), enforced sub nom. Local 1304, Steelworkers
v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Town & Country
Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029-30 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
Where the closing was complete and the only unfair labor practice was a failure
to bargain with the union about the decision, the Board has refused to order return.
Apex Linen Service, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 305, 309 (1965). Furthermore, such an un-
conditional order to resume does not preclude the employer from changing operations
in the future if the change is economically justified and he bargains with the union.
NLRB v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc., 298 F.2d 895, 899 (1st Cir. 1962).
29 See Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 556 & n.18 (1961), enforced sub nom.
Philadelphia Dress Joint Board, Garment Workers, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962) (per
curiam); Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 174 (1957), enforced sub nom.
NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959).
80 In both Sidele Fashions and Industrial Fabricating, the NLRB made its order
conditional because of this fact. In the instant case, the court of appeals felt that
this fact was a fatal weakness in the Board's unconditional bargaining order. 374 F.2d
at 302-03.
21 The trial examiner in the instant case pointed out that the tight labor market
in New York's garment industry minimized the chance that Garwin Corporation would
have to pay any substantial back-pay damages since most of the employees would
readily obtain other employment. The fact that most of the employees were married
women made it unlikely that many would relocate to the Florida plant. Yet, he felt
constrained to limit himself to traditional orders and did not order unconditional
bargaining at the new plant. 153 N.L.R.B. at 682.
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ditional bargaining orders are often promulgated when the union's
loss of majority status is a direct causal result of the employer's refusal
to bargain.82 Since the loss of the union majority in Garment
Workers was a direct consequence of the illegal relocation and refusal
to bargain, a bargaining order would seem appropriate. Indeed, un-
conditional orders have been utilized to expunge the effects of the
employer's illegal acts even when the causal relation has been some-
what attenuated.P
The bargaining order remedy has been logically extended to
cases in which the loss of majority has resulted from short distance
runaways, the courts apparently assuming that a majority of the old
employees would relocate.3 4 In California Footwear Company,0
the employer's failure to bargain regarding a move of fifteen miles
was found to violate sections 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act, and the em-
ployer was ordered to bargain unconditionally with the old union.3
The case resembled Garment Workers in that there was no majority
union at the new plant. However, the case is arguably distinguish-
able since the failure of a substantial number of employees to relocate
was due to unfair labor practices rather than to the distance moved.37
32 See Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 782, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 841 U.S. 914 (1951); NLRB v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., 163 F.2d 376,
379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 824 (1947); Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB,
189 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1944); Western Aluminum, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1191, 1192 (1963);
Tishomingo County Elec. Power Ass'n, 74 N.L.R.B. 864, 867 (1947).
as See, e.g., Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944) (loss of majority caused by
normal plant turnover); Sakrete of Northern California, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902,
908-09 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) (Board can reasonably assume
a causal connection without the necessity of finding one); NLRB v. Andrew Jergens
Co., 175 F.2d 130, 135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 838 U.S. 827 (1949). The burden is upon
the employer to show that the loss of majority status was not a consequence of his
unlawful conduct. California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765, 768 (1955), modified
sub nom. Lewis v. NLRB, 246 F.2d 386 (1957). The courts will seldom upset a Board
finding of a causal connection, even absent concrete evidence, in light of the Board's
more extensive expertise. See NLRB v. Philamon Lab., Inc., 298 F.2d 176, 182-83
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962).
3" See, e.g., Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948). Such an assumption is not
justified when the distance involved is significant. See cases cited note 29 supra and
accompanying text.
85 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955), modified sub nom. Lewis v. NLRB, 246 F.2d 386 (9th
Cir. 1957).
:Id. at 772.
lid. at 770. The dissent in Garment Workers agreed that the extent of employee
continuity is a relevant consideration but felt that temporarily imposing a minority
union upon the Florida workers was justified by the need to prevent runaway shops.
374 F.2d at 305-08.
In NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Incorporated,8 the employer moved fifty
miles without bargaining with respect to the shift or its effect upon
the employees.3 9 Although the move was found to be economically
justified, the failure to bargain constituted a violation of the Act.
The Board's unconditional bargaining order was not enforced on the
ground that the union did not represent any of the employees at
the new plant. Since the move involved little anti-union motiva-
tion 40 and, significantly, there was a majority union already represent-
ing the employees of the new plant, thus precluding an escape from
unionism, this case provides only slight assistance in resolving the
issues.in Garment Workers. To dispose of the precise issue presented
in the latter case, the NLRB elected to expand previously formulated
remedial devices. Given the unique nature of the problem, this
resolution, and the court's subsequent rejection thereof, must be
primarily evaluated in terms of the ends envisioned by the Act,
rather than merely in terms of precedent.
Resolution of labor disputes often involves the compromise of
legitimate competing interests, 41 the extent of the compromise being
limited within the statutory discretion permitted the NLRB.42 In
Garment Workers the interests of both the New York employees and
their union definitely sustained injury. However, any proposed
remedy must necessarily be cognizant of the interests of the employer
and the new Florida employees. To the circuit court, such cog-
nizance required that a remedy affecting the latter interests directly
redress the injury to the former. Thus, the court concluded that the
proper scope of the remedy must be measured solely by the objective
08 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
89 See note 11 supra.
,0 Although in the instant litigation the Board argued that Rapid Bindery was
distinguishable because it did not involve anti-union motivation, the court of appeals
rejected this distinction on the ground that it would result in punishing an employer
for his unlawful intent. The court concluded that the degree of hostility could not
be the "touchstone of judicial response" in determining the propriety of an uncondi-
tional order. 374 F.2d at 303. The dissent agreed with the Board that Rapid Bindery
was distinguishable.
41 "It is a commonplace, but one too easily lost sight of, that labor legislation tradi-
tionally entails the adjustment and compromise of competing interests which in the
abstract or from a purely partisan point of view may seem irreconcilable. The
'policy of the Act' is embodied in the totality of that adjustment, and not necessarily in
any single demand which may have figured, however weightily, in it." Local 1424.
IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 428 (1960); see NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S.
344 (1953).
412 374 F.2d at 302-03.
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of redressing the injury to the New York employees. 4 This position
implicitly limits the applicability of unconditional bargaining orders
to those runaway cases where employee continuity is present. Short
of an order for employer return,44 back pay and reinstatement orders
thereby become the only available relief for distant runaway cases. 4"
However, an unfair labor practice has effects upon the employees
concerned beyond those which are purely economic. It has been
recognized that a refusal to bargain may also affect employee morale,
Is The circuit court found this goal to be primary and thus conditioned the propriety
of a remedy on the extent to which that objective was accomplished. Id. at 300-
02. It is fundamental that the employees' injuries must be redressed. See Local 60,
Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 656 (1961) (concurring opinion); Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311
U.S. 7 (1940).
"Before the circuit court, the union argued that the redress provided by an order
to offer reinstatement in Florida would be illusory on the facts at hand and that there-
fore an order to return was also needed. Brief for Petitioners at 7-8. As had the trial
examiner, 153 N.L.R.B. at 681-82, the Board took the position that an order to
return would impose undue financial hardship upon the employer. Brief for the
NLRB at 50. This appears to have satisfied the court. 374 F.2d at 300 n.7; accord,
Bonnie Lass Knitting Mills, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1960), modified sub noma. Colfax
Industries, 133 N.L.R.B. 722 (1961). See also Jersey Farmers Milk Service, Inc., 148
N.L.R.B. 1392 (1964); The Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962). Other
arguments against return orders include the Supreme Court's position that a reinstate-
ment order should cause as little dislocation of the employer's business as possible,
Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 195 (1941); the possible disruptive effects
on interstate commerce, 53 MxcH. L. REv. 627 (1955); and the possible unfairness to
the employees who have followed the plant or have hired on at its new location.
Jacob H. Klotz & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 778 (1939), modified, 29 N.L.R.B. 14 (1941).
On the other hand, one could argue that a reasonable return order is not beyond
the Board's § 10 (c) power, and that anything less puts the burden of the employer's
activity on the employees. See Tennessee-Carolina Transp. Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369,
1375 (1954) (dissenting opinion); Williams Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 715, 738-39 (1941)
(dissenting opinion); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, 972 (1940) (concurring
opinion).
, In Garment Workers the collective bargaining agreement in force between the
parties included a provision for severance pay in the event the union agreed to a move
beyond a specified distance. 153 N.L.R.B. at 680 n.35. The Board could set the amount
at a figure which it felt would totally offset the effects of the unfair labor practice and
then argue that the amount is not punitive on this basis. See generally 7 InD. & LAD.
REL. Rv. 262, 268 (1954). Also, S 10 () of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 () (1964), provides for injunctions which might be helpful if the employer had
not already completed the move.
The bargaining order would have no economic effect on the New York employees
since they would not be present in Florida. 374 F.2d at 302. The court recognized that
the New York employees would be "out of the picture" if the employer stayed in
Florida and the employees did not follow. Moreover, the Board's remedy assumes that
they would not follow. Id. However, this is not a fatal infirmity since in Phelps-
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1944), the Court held an order for rein-
statement proper, even where the employees who had been discriminated against had
obtained other employment and would thus not be affected by the order. The order
was considered necessary to erase the effects of the unfair labor practice.
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disrupt their organization, and deter union membership. 46 To
avoid these consequences, "one of the chief responsibilities of the
Board is to direct such actions as will dissipate the unwholesome
effect .... ,14T he discouraging effects of a refusal to bargain would
seem to operate as surely on the New York employees in Garment
Workers as on employees in a non-relocation context. Thus, while
the bargaining order might more clearly dissipate the deleterious
effects of a refusal to bargain when operating directly upon the
employees injured, the knowledge that the employer was punished by
being forced to bargain with the union after relocation might also
improve worker morale and encourage union support among the
employees left behind. Furthermore, the knowledge that the em-
ployer cannot escape their choice of representative will tend to im-
munize the original workers from possible coercion in future repre-
sentation proceedings. 48 The bargaining order thus stands as a viable
method of protecting collective bargaining. Under the doctrine of
Garment Workers, however, the coercive potential of distant reloca-
tion remains substantially unfettered.
Aside from protection for the rights of injured employees, the
union itself may also have interests deserving redress. Implicit
recognition of the union's independent interest is found in the
Board's development of the election and certification bar rules which
are designed to provide stability and to encourage the union's suc-
cess. 49 Also, many court decisions give the union, as an entity, an
,0 See Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944). Franks Brothers refused
to bargain and undertook other activities which, coupled with normal plant turnover,
caused the union to lose its majority. An unconditional bargaining order was issued
by the Board. Franks Bros., 44 N.L.R.B. 898 (1942). The Board noted that "[Tjhe
only means by which a refusal to bargain can be remedied is an affirmative order
requiring the employer to bargain with the Union which represented a majority at the
time the unfair labor practice was committed." Id. at 917 n.24. This argument has
received some circuit court approval. See NLRB v. Philamon Lab., Inc., 298 F.2d 176,
183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962).
' Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944).
, The employees at the old location have an interest in protecting their right
to elect a representative and to preserve their choice from alteration without their con-
sent. E.g., Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960). Obviously, these rights
would be impinged to the extent the employers were free to take action which would
deprive the union of its representative status.
19 The election bar rule provides: "No election shall be directed in any bargaining
unit or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid
election shall have been held." National Labor Relations Act § 9 (c) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159 (c) (3) (1964). Similarly, the certification bar rule was created by the Board to
provide a union, once elected and certified, with a one-year grace period without
having to face a new election. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); 23 NLRB ANN.
opportunity to gain employee support where it has been injured by
acts of the employer, although the decisions are often based upon the
right of the employees to make an uncoerced choice of representa-
tive.50 This independent interest was recognized in Garment
Workers by the court's suggestion that the NLRB might order the
employer to reimburse the union for its expense of organizing in New
York and for the costs of the membership campaign in Florida.r1
However, the court was willing to provide only economic relief, and
refused to return the union to its previous status in the new loca-
tion.52
The failure of the court to adopt the full extent of the remedies
available to it in protecting the interests of the New York employees
and the union rests squarely upon the court's recognition of com-
peting legitimate interests. 53 Thus, an issue of major significance in
Garment Workers is the extent to which the NLRB may focus its
relief upon precluding the employer from realizing the benefits of
his unfair labor practice.5 4 The NLRB sought to remedy the effect
REP. 29-30 (1958); Cushman, The Duration of Certificates by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability, 45 MicH. L. Rav. 1 (1946).
Finally, the contract bar rule, supra note 16, provides the union with a period in which
to succeed. None of these rules is conditioned upon any continuing support by a
majority and would continue in effect even if the entire labor force were changed
after the happening of the event upon which the bar arose.
"0See, e.g., Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); Sakrete of Northern
California, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965);
NLRB v. J.C. Hamilton Co., 220 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1955); Superior Engraving Co. v.
NLRB, 183 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951); Great Southern
Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 984 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 729 (1944).
" 374 F.2d at 304 n.22.
52 The union may also have had access to a separate remedial course. Since the
contract with the employer is not ended by his unfair labor practice, Local 44, Metal
Polishers v. Viking Equip. Co., 278 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1960), the union may have con-
tract rights enforceable by § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964). This provision sets forth an alternative remedy for the union if there is an
applicable provision in the contract. However, the contract in Garment Workers,
while providing for severance pay and requiring the employer to procure union per-
mission before moving, had no provision expressly providing for protection of the
union in the event of relocation. Joint Appendix of the Court at 203.
It should be noted, however, that § 301 cannot derogate from the Board's authority
to afford complete relief. Section 10 (a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1964), provides
that the Board has the power to prevent any person from engaging in an unfair
labor practice and that "this power shall not be affected by any other means of adjust-
ment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or other-
wise ......
"See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
"See 374 F.2d at 302-03. See also Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944);
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940); NLRB v. Philamon Lab., Inc., 298
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of the relocation, and further the policy of the Act, by requiring
Garwin to bargain with the union it had attempted to escape, thus
denying any gain to the employer 55 and superficially restoring the
status quo.56 However, because this order provided little direct
redress for the injured employees, the circuit court found it to be be-
yond the Board's authority since such a resolution was of insufficient
remedial efficacy to outweigh the necessity of protecting the free
choice of the Florida employees.57
In most cases, both denial of benefit and redress of injury result
from the double-edged sword of the bargaining order. Perhaps for
this reason, there is little authority beyond Garment Workers spe-
cifically conditioning the propriety of denying the employer his
benefit upon a coextensive redress of the employees' injuries. How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit, in the case of NLRB v. Coates & Clark, In-
corporated, has noted the Board position that an order is equally
valid if designed to afford restitution or to prevent gain to the male-
factor from his transgression.58 The Coates court went on to provide
that a remedy could be described as improperly punitive if it at-
tempted to make an example of the employer, but not if it purported
F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962); NLRB v. J.C. Hamilton Co., 220
F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1955); Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 984 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 729 (1944).
55 The employer in Garment Workers argued that there was no proof that he would
gain from the illegal aspect of the relocation. Brief for Intervenor at 27.
51 153 N.L.R.B. at 666. The Board also reasoned that return to the status quo would
be accomplished by such an order in Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1238 (1948),
but the move in that case involved only 110 miles. However, this distance is still be-
yond the normal commuting distance and significantly further than the 30 miles
found prohibitive in Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
Denial of gain to the employer from his unfair labor practice is frequently the
objective of a remedy. See, e.g., Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944); Bannon
Mills, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 611 (1964); Tennessee Valley Broadcasting Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 895
(1949), modified, 192 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1951) (per curiam). See generally Bok, The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. R-v. 38, 132-39 (1964).
5 7 The court observed: "Were the Board engaging in a genuine balancing of the
rights of newly hired workers against those of discriminatees whose places they took, we
would allow it very wide scope. But . .. we find it difficult to see justification for a
remedy which deprives Florida workers of a basic right without genuinely benefitting
the injured workers in New York." 374 F.2d at 302.
58 See NLRB v. Coates & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1957). In Coates,
the circuit court noted this position in finding an order of reinstatement to be puni-
tive when the employees involved were not properly entitled to reinstatement. The
Board's position was said to be that an "order may be designed to make someone whole
... and/or the order may be designed to prevent the violator from benefitting by his
misdeed." Id.
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to restore to someone a right to which he was entitled or to deprive a
malfeasor of some advantage. 59
Further support for the position of the NLRB may be found in
the Taft-Hartley Act itself. Section 1 of the Act emphasizes the
fundamental necessity of encouraging collective bargaining. 0 Thus
it may be contended that any remedy which discourages practices in-
terfering with collective bargaining furthers the policy of the Act and
is thereby justified. Although this argument is qualified by the
prohibition against punitive remedies6' and the requirement that
orders be in specific terms,6 2 the Board may, within these limitations,
attempt to discourage unfair labor practices63 by demonstrating that
violators of the Act will be denied profit, even if not actually pun-
9 Id. In National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 850 (1940), the Court stated:
"The public right and the duty [of the Board] extend not only to the prevention of
unfair labor practices by the employer in the future, but to the prevention of his enjoy-
ment of any advantages which he has gained by violation of the Act .... " Id. at 864
(emphasis added). This case involved contracts between the employer and individual
employees which were viewed as a continuing unfair labor practice. Although the
Garment Workers court emphasized the prevention of employer enjoyment of any
advantages gained from his violation, it did not stress the prevention of unfair prac-
tices by the employer in the future. However, in Garment Workers the coercive effect
upon the employees of an uncorrected wrong would also be a continuing one.
60 One of the means by which the basic policy of the Act, the elimination of the
causes of "obstructions to the free flow of commerce," is to be accomplished is
through "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." Labor-
Management Relations Act § 101 (1), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).61 The argument that a given remedy will deter employer violations cannot alone
justify the remedy if it is otherwise punitive. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S.
7 (1940).
62 See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941). The Board in Express
ordered the employer to bargain and to cease and desist from violating the Act in any
manner whatsoever. Because an order of the Board, if enforced, may subject the em-
ployer to contempt sanctions, the Supreme Court held that the order must be specific.
Thus, as to the particular employer subject to a given order, the Board has authority
to restrain an unfair labor practice which it has found or one that is "persuasively
related" to the one determined, but not unfair labor practices generally. If the rule
were otherwise, it would force a court, in contempt proceedings for violation of the
Board's prior order, to adjudicate the merits of unfair labor practices, contrary to
§ 10 (a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1964). Violations which are "persuasively re-
lated" include those where prior conduct shows a clear threat of continued unfair labor
practices by the offending employer. 312 U.S. at 435.
'3 See 18 STAN. L. REv. 942 n.35 (1965). In Garment Workers, the Board argued on
appeal that such deterrence would be a beneficial result of the unconditional bargain-
ing order. Brief for the NLRB at 41. Authority to pursue a goal of general deterrence
was claimed from § 10 (a) of the Act, which provides in part: "The Board is empowered
* . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting
commerce." National Labor Relations Act § 10 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1964). The
court, however, felt this provision was limited to practices constituting continuing
violations of the Act. 374 F.2d at 303-04. See also note 62 supra.
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ished.6 4 Arguably, acceptance of a policy aimed at denying the
employer the benefits of his violation would not only tend to restore
the status quo but would also act to deter future illegal violations.
The above concepts seemingly support a remedial theory based
upon the denial of employer benefits improperly gained through
relocation. In Garment Workers, however, this approach resulted
in the contravention of another basic policy of the Act-protection of
the employee's right to self-determination regarding his union repre-
sentative.65 The court found the abridgment of this right,66 recog-
nized in the Board's one-year contract bar limitation under the in-
6, See, e.g., NLRB v. Philamon Lab., Inc., 298 F.2d 176, 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 919 (1962) ("[To deny the Board the power to order an effective remedy]
might well encourage employers to refuse to bargain, commit the ancillary violations,
*.. and then rely upon the inevitable intervening turnover in personnel to ward off the
only effective remedy remaining.'). The purpose of allowing the Board to order affirma-
tive acts is to recreate conditions as they were but for the unfair labor practice. A
remedy must do more than tend to deter violations of the Act and this is all that it does
where the violation caused no known harm. However, one might argue that the
violation by Garwin discouraged all employees who knew of it and that the remedy
denying benefit to Garwin removed that discouragement for all employees who knew
of the remedy. As to their enthusiasm for collective bargaining, this would return
them to where they were before the violation.
"5 The court in Garment Workers referred to the right of self-determination as "a
cornerstone of the National Labor Relations Act . 8..." 374 F.2d at 301. It noted that
the new employees' rights include, of course, the right not to have a union at all. Id.
The right not to have a union was recognized by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments
in order to protect employees from union coercion, not to reduce the Board's remedial
discretion. NLRB v. Geigy Co., 211 F.2d 553, 558-59 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
821 (1954).
The Act recognizes the importance of self-determination in § 7, note 5 supra, and
§ 9 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1964). Section 9 (a) provides in part that "representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit.. ..
"6 The right to self-determination is fundamental. "It may be asserted, without
fear of contradiction, that the interest in employee freedom of choice is one of those
given large recognition by the Act as amended. But neither can one disregard the
interest in 'industrial peace which it is the overall purpose of the Act to secure.'"
Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 428 (1960).
However, there are limits upon self-determination built into the Act or necessitated
by it. Examples are the election bar rule in § 9 (c) (3), the certification bar rule, and
the contract bar rule. See note 49 supra. All of these have the effect of denying an
election for a specific time for the sake of labor stability regardless of the possibly
changed wishes of a majority once a union is properly elected or certified or reaches a
collective bargaining agreement with the employer. Another limitation, albeit indirect,
is the six-month statute of limitations upon actions for unfair labor parctices contained
in § 10 (b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1964). Thus, if an employer illegally deals
with a minority union and reaches a contract, it is enforceable if no complaint is
brought within six months, regardless of the desire of a majority of the employees.
E.g., Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, supra.
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stant order,67 to be arbitrary68 since the order neither redressed the
injury to the New York employees nor was necessary to promote in-
dustrial calm.69 Thus the right of self-determination becomes para-
mount to the interest of the union as an entity, the amorphous in-
terest of the public, and the necessity of at least a superficial return
to the status quo.
In the usual situation resulting in the promulgation of an un-
conditional bargaining order, 0 interference with the right of self-
determination is thought to be sufficiently mitigated by the fact that
such orders do not establish a permanent relationship.7' Once condi-
tions emendable to free choice are re-established by expunging the
effects of the unfair labor practice, an election is ordered to reflect
the majority will72 and substantiate the policy of self-determination.
In the usual case, however, some employee continuity prevails so that
the originally affected employees find redress in the order.78  Limita-
tion of the self-determination rights of other employees is found to
be a sacrifice warranted by the efficacy of the original redress.
On the other hand, in the absence of employee continuity, the
Garment Workers court refused to fetter the rights of the innocent
employees.7 4  Although the right of self-determination is not abso-
lute, but must accommodate effectuation of the Act's policies,
Garment Workers requires that the active interests subject to the Act
67 The court felt the one-year limitation upon the effect on the Florida employees
was not sufficiently mitigative of its negative impact once the right of self-determina-
tion was acknowledged. 374 F.2d at 302.
88 Id. at 304.
69 Id. at 300-04.
To See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
71 See Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944); Sakrete of Northern Cali-
fornia, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 879 U.S. 961 (1965)
(none of the union's members were employed by the employer when the order was
given).
72 See NLRB v. J.C. Hamilton Co., 220 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Andrew
Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 US. 827 (1949); Great Southern
Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 984 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 729 (1944); ef.
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n.16 (1962).
78 See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
7' The dissent argues from Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), that even if the
Florida employees should prevail, the employer is not the one to argue their case in an
effort to decrease his own burden. 374 F.2d at 308. Since "to allow employers to rely
on employees' rights in refusing to bargain with the formally designated union is not
conducive to [promoting industrial peace], it is inimical to it." 348 U.S. at 103. The
majority, however, felt that the argument for the new employees did not lose its valid-
ity simply because it was urged by the employer. 374 F.2d at 300.
7 See note 66 supra. The willingness of the courts to presume a majority in certain
of the short-distance runaway shop cases without requiring a finding to that effect by
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be equally balanced; i.e., a severe limitation upon one interest must
produce a commensurate benefit to the other interests. Thus, once
redress of injuries to the New York employees is seen as the equiva-
lent of promoting industrial peace within the policies of the Act,76 a
remedy limiting the determinative interest without providing redress
for these injuries fails to adequately compromise the policies of the
Act. Moreover, not only does a lack of redress fail to promote the
goal of industrial tranquility, but that status may be in fact disrupted
by an order forcing an uninvited union upon a possibly anti-union
labor force.77
Beyond failing to weigh adequately the interests of the Florida
employees, the Board's remedy also was found to have insufficiently
considered the employer's right to be free of punitive remedies for its
violation of the statute.78  The court characterized the order as
punitive since, again, it provided no redress for the injured em-
ployees.79 Although the language of the Act merely requires that the
employer bargain with the representative selected by a majority of
his employees, unconditional bargaining orders have rarely been held
punitive, even in those cases where employee continuity has been
limited or assumed.80 The court also could have easily required
Garwin to demonstrate the imposition of an unfair burden before
the order could be deemed punitive,8' thus affirming the scope of
the Board, see notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text, is another indication of the
non-absolute nature of self-determination. The Supreme Court has also adopted such
a presumption. See NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942) (per curiam).
76The court treated the promotion of industrial peace as equivalent to redressing
the grievances of the New York employees. Since this end was unfulfilled, the issue
for the court became whether denial of gain to the employer, unrelated to redressing
grievances, is sufficient to outweigh the infringement upon the rights of the new em-
ployees. 374 F.2d at 302.
"7 In the case of an adverse labor force, the effect of an unconditional bargaining
order in protecting the public interest may be non-existent. In fact, the opposite may
result. Not only might the labor force rebel against its unchosen but enforced repre-
sentative, but the power of the union to bargain effectively, utilizing the threat of
strike, would be severely limited in light of an uncooperative employee membership.
78 See note 24 supra.
79 374 F.2d at 300. In Local 60, Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961),
the Court found that the unfair labor practice had no consequences because the em-
ployees were not coerced by not being treated fairly by the offending union. In these
circumstances, since there was no effect to dissipate, any remedy would be punitive.
80 see notes 32 and 40 supra and accompanying text.
S'Authority for a requirement that undue burden be proved may be found in
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964). The Supreme
Court stated: "There has been no showing that the Board's order restoring the status
quo ante to insure meaningful bargaining [by ordering subcontracted work resumed
and employees reinstated] is not well designed to promote the policies of the Act.
Nor is there any evidence which would justify disturbing the Board's conclusion that the
Vol. 1967: 1215] LABOR LAW 1231
1232 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1967:1215
discretion lodged in the NLRB.8 2 On the other hand, this approach
would derogate from the court's conception of the paramount con-
sideration in the exercise of that discretion-that the NLRB not
diminish one right under the Act, without corresponding gain to
other rights, for the sole purpose of accomplishing an end, denial of
benefit, not required by the Act. Given the pre-eminence of this
consideration, the order could only be an improper attempt to accom-
plish ends beyond those embodied in the policies of the Act.83
Unfortunately, the court's emphasis 'upon delimiting the broad
confines of the Board's discretionary powers gives little assistance in
determining an adequate remedy for the problem of relocation.
Garment Workers resolves some of the previous vagaries in the area
by implicitly requiring some degree of employee continuity to justify
imposition of an unconditional bargaining order. Nevertheless, the
consequence is to cement the remedial gap through which an em-
ployer may escape a union by effectively denying the only method of
redress approximating a return to the status quo short of enforced
return to the original location. Moreover, by requiring that there
be a direct correlation between the consequence of a remedial order
and employee injuries, the court has perhaps over-emphasized the
employee interests in relation to those of the union and the public,
while greatly curtailing the remedies available to the NLRB in deal-
ing with relocation. The regrettable result may be an inability by
the Board to fashion new remedies within the confines of the court's
requirement, thus compelling the agency to invoke forced return
to the original business location. Although surely assuaging the em-
ployee interests, and seemingly meeting the Garment Workers
standard, it may be questioned whether the resentment, turmoil, and
oppressive cost to the employer of such an order will further the
commercial tranquility so basic to the Act.
order would not impose an undue or unfair burden on the Company." Id. In Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), the order was punitive because it required the
employer to indemnify the public agency which had aided employees harmed by his
unfair labor practice. No area of public interest as provided for in the Act was spe-
cifically at issue beyond redressing employees, and they had already "been made secure
in their right of collective bargaining and [had] been made whole .... " without the
objectionable part of the remedy. Id. at 11. The public interest in industrial peace is
the public interest involved in Garment Workers.
:2 see notes 22 and 27 supra and accompanying text.
" Adopting this precept, the circuit court quoted from Fibrebroad Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964): "The Board's order will not be disturbed 'unless
it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those
which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.'" 374 F.2d at 300.
